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Chief Judge Rader influences patent jurisprudence in 
other nations through his interaction with judges and 
lawyers from these jurisdictions. He also uses the 
comparative method to gain insights from experiences in 
these jurisdictions to improve U.S. patent 
jurisprudence. This Article discusses opinions authored by 
Chief Judge Rader from the comparative law perspective. It 
discusses his influence on European and Japanese patent 
jurisprudence in the three areas: the (I) patent eligibility, 
(II) nonobviousness, and (III) enablement-written 
description requirements. Judge Rader likewise used his 
knowledge of foreign jurisprudence to interpret U.S. patent 
statutes and to develop doctrines in these areas. 
 
  
                                                                                                         
* W. Hunter Simpson Professor of Technology Law, Director of the Center 
for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Property, University of 
Washington School of Law.  
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This author met Chief Judge Randall Rader for the first time at 
the Association of American Law School (AALS) annual meeting 
in Washington, D.C. in 1997. Since then, the judge has been a 
great mentor and inspiration for academic research and writing. He 
invited me to spend time in his chambers and work with his 
fulltime law clerks on cases assigned to him. The experience 
working with him gave invaluable insights into reading opinions 
and analyzing U.S. case law. Judge Rader has given similar 
opportunities not only to U.S. law students, but also to European 
and Japanese lawyers who attended the LL.M. programs in which 
he teaches as an adjunct professor. He is a frequent speaker for 
patent-related seminars and conferences and engages in debates 
with European and Japanese judges on issues that parties present in 
patent infringement litigation filed in their courts. Just as he is one 
of the most influential persons in my academic career, he has made 
a substantial impact on the development of professional and 
academic careers for key people in the European and Japanese IP 
community. 
Such influences appear in European and Japanese case law 
through opinions and briefs authored by judges and lawyers who 
are familiar with U.S. patent jurisprudence. Although courts in 
civil law countries, such as Japanese courts, do not have a tradition 
2
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of citing cases, particularly cases from foreign jurisdictions, 
European and Japanese judges are open to a well-reasoned 
argument regardless of the source. Judges who are exposed to U.S. 
ideas through work with Chief Judge Rader or his presentations 
may readily find merit in arguments in briefs prepared by U.S.-
trained lawyers. Such an influence is confirmed by similarity in 
discussions and reasoning on important patentability and 
infringement issues between opinions authored by European and 
Japanese judges and by Chief Judge Rader.  
Chief Judge Rader’s knowledge on patent jurisprudence in 
foreign countries also brings great benefit to the U.S. patent 
community. He uses the comparative law method for analyzing 
issues presented to his courts and highlights various features of the 
U.S. patent system that contrast with foreign patent systems, 
helping U.S. legal professionals develop an in-depth understanding 
of patent policies underlying the parties’ disputes from the global 
perspective. His openness to ideas from foreign countries and his 
effort to develop the best practices for enhancing patent policies 
naturally have brought some aspects of U.S. patent system more in 
line with the rest of the world.  
This Article discusses opinions authored by Chief Judge Rader 
from the comparative law perspective. It compares his opinions 
with opinions authored by European and Japanese judges and 
discusses his influence in European and Japanese patent 
jurisprudence and vice versa. This Article focuses on three areas—
the (I) patent eligibility, (II) nonobviousness, and  
(III) enablement/
 
written description requirements—in which Judge 
Rader used his knowledge on foreign jurisprudence to interpret the 
U.S. patent statute and to develop doctrines. This Article also 
reviews opinions authored by European and Japanese judges with 
respect to Judge Rader’s work in these three areas to discuss his 
contribution to comparative patent law.  
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
 
A.  The United States 
 
An important issue in patent law is whether an invention fits 
within the subject matter that is eligible for a patent.   The U.S. 
3
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patent system  benefits from Chief Judge Rader’s broad knowledge 
of foreign patent systems when it comes to assessing patent 
eligibility. It is very rare for U.S. courts, at least in patent cases, to 
take account of statutes and jurisprudence of foreign countries. 
Chief Judge Rader changed this tradition and used comparative 
law to support his views. In In re Bilski,1
Unlike the laws of other nations that include broad 
exclusions to eligible subject matter, such as 
European restrictions on software and other method 
patents . . . and prohibitions against patents deemed 
contrary to the public morality . . . U.S. law and 
policy have embraced advances without regard to 
their subject matter.
 Chief Judge Rader 
emphasized the broad scope of patent eligible subject matter under 
the U.S. Patent Act in comparison to that of the European Patent 
Convention. 
2
Chief Judge Rader believes that this broad patent eligibility 
gives the U.S. patent system enough flexibility to embrace 
unknown fields of inventions and to guarantee incentives for new 
innovations, which leads the U.S. to be a top innovation-driven 
country in global competition. To maintain this broad eligibility, 
he urges limiting exclusions from patent eligibility to three items 
expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court: (1) laws of nature; (2) 
natural phenomena; and (3) abstract ideas.
 
3 Nevertheless, he 
concluded that the claims at issue in Bilski should be rejected for 




 He explained that the reason why an abstract idea is 
excluded from patent eligibility is to adhere to the constitutional 
goal of the patent system: “[T]he [Patent] Act intends, as 
 explains, to provide ‘useful’ technology”; thus, “[a]n abstract 
idea must be applied to (transformed into) a practical use before it 
qualifies for protection.”5
                                                                                                         
1 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
   
2 Id. at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1011 
5 Id. at 1013. 
4
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Inspired by Judge Rader, Judge Haldane Robert Mayer also 
used comparative law to support his view by citing the definition 
of statutory invention under the Japanese Patent Act (JPA) and the 
Patent Act of the Republic of Korea in his dissenting opinion.6 
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of eligibility, “the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end,”7
 
 he 
argued that the scope of patent eligibility should include only 
technological subject matter because “applying laws of nature to 
new and useful ends is nothing other than ‘technology’” as these 
foreign patent acts define patent eligible inventions. As a result, he 
concluded that business methods should be excluded from patent 
eligibility. 
B.  Japan 
 
Contrary to Judge Mayer’s restrictive interpretation of patent 
eligibility, the definition of invention under the JPA does not 
categorically exclude business methods. The JPA defines a 
statutory invention as the highly advanced creation of technical 
ideas that utilize a law of nature.8 The statute requires a highly 
advanced level of creation because of the need to distinguish the 
subject matter of the patent from that of the utility model, which is 
a type of petite patent that requires only a low level of 
nonobviousness or inventive step.9
The key to distinguishing patent-eligible subject matter from 
ineligible subject matter under JPA is the utilization or application 
of a law of nature. Some Japanese judges interpret “laws of nature” 
broadly in the same manner as Chief Judge Rader interprets “an 
abstract idea” to include any law or principle that can be applied to 
a practical use. They may find a statutory invention with respect to 
a business method as long as the method provides a concrete and 
useful result regardless of the nature of the practical use. 
 
Such a broad interpretation is highlighted in the phoneme index 
                                                                                                         
6 Id. at 1003. 
7 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
8 Japanese Patent Act (JPA), art. 2, para 1. 
9 Compare JPA art. 29, para. 2 with Japanese Utility model Act, art. 3, 
para. 2. 
5
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dictionary case.10
The broadest claim does not require a computer or machine, 
and thus the method can be implemented manually. The JPO 
rejected the claim for lack of statutory invention because it found 
that the claim is directed to a mental process or a scheme arbitrary 
to the party who set out the scheme. The IP High Court reversed 
the JPO’s rejection because it found that the method utilizes a law 
of nature to solve a problem. In defining the claimed invention, the 
court held that the method solves a problem (i.e. finding an English 
word without knowing the spelling of the word) by utilizing the 
ability to recognize consonants in English words more easily than 
vowels. It found that this ability is a law of nature because the 
useful result, finding an English word, is not unique to a particular 
individual, but is available to all Japanese users. In other words, a 
method that utilizes a law of nature constitutes a statutory 
invention if it provides a useful and concrete result. Accordingly, 
the interpretation of a law of nature under the JPA adopted by the 
phoneme index case is much broader than a narrow definition that 
includes only a principle or idea deriving from a scientific theory. 
 Reviewing an appeal from the Japan Patent 
Office (JPO), Japan’s IP High Court found statutory invention with 
respect to a claim for a method of finding words in a bilingual 
dictionary. In this case, the court held that the method relied on a 
law of nature based on a theory that Japanese-speaking people 
generally recognize consonants in English words more easily than 
vowels. The claimed method uses this law of nature to help a non-
English speaker, such as a native Japanese speaker, to find an 
English word in the dictionary by utilizing a unique phoneme 
index multi-element matrix. The matrix includes rows consisting 
of four elements of a particular English word: (1) a consonant in 
the word; (2) the vocal accent and consonants (phonetic symbols); 
(3) spelling; and (4) translation. Columns consist of English words 
in alphabetical order. Because Japanese people generally recognize 
consonants in English words more easily than vowels, they can 
find the same combination of consonants in the matrix and look up 
the word they are looking for in the dictionary.  
                                                                                                         
10 Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High C.] Aug. 26, 
2008, Hei 20 (gyō-ke) 10001, Saikō Saibansho Saibanrei Jōhō [Saibanrei Jōhō], 
http://www.courts.go.jp. Please note that the party of this case is not disclosed. 
6
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It is likely that the interpretation includes a principle deriving from 
purely empirical or non-theoretical ideas.  
Just as Chief Judge Rader’s policy-oriented, flexible approach 
is endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court,11 the IP High Court’s 
approach should be supported by Japan’s national policy to 
become an IP-based nation.12 As the U.S. Supreme Court did in 
Bilski, Japan’s policymakers have already addressed the need to 
make the patent system ready for inventions in the Information 
Age.13 To secure protection for such inventions, the JPA was 
revised to clarify that the definition of statutory invention includes 
certain computer programs as patent-eligible subject matter.14
 
 
Reflecting the same needs and policies, the IP High Court has 
adopted a broad interpretation that aligns with Chief Judge Rader’s 
approach to patent eligibility by giving courts flexibility to 
embrace unknown fields of inventions. 
II. OBVIOUSNESS 
 
A.  The United States 
 
Another facet of the U.S. patent system that benefits from 
Chief Judge Rader’s extensive knowledge of foreign patent 
jurisprudence is obviousness.  He used this knowledge both to 
avoid inappropriate uses of the obviousness analysis and to defend 
appropriate uses of it to ensure that patents do not get granted for 
unworthy inventions.  
In In re Deuel,15
                                                                                                         
11 Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of 
Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012). 
 the Federal Circuit found nonobviousness 
with respect to a claim directed to cDNA molecules that encode a 
certain protein, heparin-binding growth factors. The prior art did 
not suggest the particular molecules, even if the general idea of the 
12 Ichiro Nakayama & Toshiko Takenaka, Will Intellectual Property Policy 
Save Japan from Recessions? Japan’s Basic Intellectual Property Policy and Its 
Implementation Through the National Strategic Program, 35 IIC 877 (2004). 
13 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
14 JPA, art. 2, para. 3, item 1. 
15 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
7
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claimed cDNA, its function, and its general chemical nature were 
obvious from the prior art.16 Deuel led to a special rule for DNA 
inventions: DNA is nonobvious over the prior art when the art 
includes (1) a disclosure of the amino acid sequence of the protein 
that the claimed DNA molecules encode and (2) a disclosure of a 
general method for isolating the claimed DNA.17 The 
nonobviousness standard under this special rule is more lenient 
than the inventive-step standard that the rest of the world follows 
and presents a significant obstacle to USPTO collaboration with 
other patent offices for examination of DNA inventions.18
Keenly aware of the USPTO’s need to harmonize patentability 
standards, Chief Judge Rader commented on the serious problem 
caused by the lenient nonobviousness standard. In In re Fisher, the 
USPTO rejected claims that direct to expressed sequence tags 
(“ESTs”) for encoding proteins and protein fragments in maize 
plants due to lack of specific utility.
   
19 The Federal Circuit 
endorsed the USPTO’s practice of requiring substantial and 
specific utility through its Utility Examination Guidelines. It cited 
Brenner v. Manson,20 highlighting the function of the utility 
requirement for eliminating subject matter that does not deserve 
the grant of exclusive protection through a patent.21
Chief Judge Rader dissented because he found that the claimed 
express sequence tags have use as a research tool that provides a 
benefit to society, thus having required utility.
 
22
                                                                                                         
16 Id. at 1558. 
 He criticized the 
USPTO and the Fisher court’s majority for failing to place the 
burden of challenging the utility asserted by the applicant on the 
USPTO. In his view, the lenient nonobviousness standard under 
Deuel’s special rule for DNA inventions forced the USPTO to 
adopt a heightened standard of utility for ESTs. According to Chief 
17 Thomas Isenbarger, In re Kubin’s Reinvigorated Nonobviousness 
Standard for DNA Patents, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2009). 
18 Trilateral Project B3b, Mutual Understanding in Search and 
Examination: Comparative Study on Biotechnology Patent Practices, 
TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net/projects/biotechnology/mutual.pdf.  
19 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
20 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
21 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
22 Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
8
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Judge Rader, to make up for the marginalized function of the 
nonobviousness requirement, the USPTO needs to rely on the 
utility requirement for eliminating patent-unworthy DNA 
inventions: 
In truth, I have some sympathy with the Patent 
Office’s dilemma. The Office needs some tool to 
reject inventions that may advance the “useful arts” 
but not sufficiently to warrant the valuable 
exclusive right of a patent. The Patent Office has 
seized upon this utility requirement to reject these 
research tools as contributing “insubstantially” to 
the advance of the useful arts. The utility 
requirement is ill suited to that task, however, 
because it lacks any standard for assessing the state 
of the prior art and the contributions of the claimed 
advance. The proper tool for assessing sufficient 
contribution to the useful arts is the obviousness 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. Unfortunately this 
court has deprived the Patent Office of the 
obviousness requirement for genomic inventions.23
In urging the Federal Circuit to overrule Deuel, Chief Judge 
Rader used comparative law to criticize the special rule: 
“Nonetheless, rather than distort the utility test, the Patent Office 
should seek ways to apply the correct test, the test used worldwide 
for such assessments (other than in the United States), namely 
inventive step or obviousness.”
 
24
Because nonobviousness was not an issue on appeal in Fisher, 
Chief Judge Rader had to wait for an opportunity to address the 
problem in a case in which nonobviousness of DNA invention was 
squarely presented. He found such an opportunity in In re Kubin,
 
25
                                                                                                         
23 Id. at 1381-82 (citing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (Rader, 
J., dissenting). 
 
where the USPTO rejected DNA molecules for obviousness 
despite the lack of the prior art suggesting a particular structure of 
the molecules. Like Deuel, the prior art included a disclosure of the 
24 Id. at 1382. 
25 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
9
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particular amino acid sequence of the protein that the claimed 
DNA molecules encode and a disclosure of the method for 
isolating the DNA. 
Instead of hearing the case en banc and overruling Deuel for 
upholding the USPTO’s rejection, Chief Judge Rader relied on 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. to set aside Deuel.26 He 
viewed the Federal Circuit’s application of the nonobviouness 
standard in Deuel as inflexible, like the application in KSR, and 
thus inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.27 Relying on the 
Supreme Court’s criticism of the Federal Circuit’s application of 
the “obvious-to-try” doctrine (which cites Deuel), Chief Judge 
Rader concluded that “the Supreme Court in KSR unambiguously 
discredited that holding [in Deuel].”28
Nevertheless, he made clear that application of the “obvious-
to-try” doctrine is proper if the doctrine is applied flexibly on a 
case-by-case basis by taking into account the number of choices.
 
29
Although Chief Judge Rader is eager to admit mistakes made 
by his court in KSR and Deuel, he fiercely protects the court’s 
practice in which the nonobviousness standard is properly applied. 
The nonobviousness standard functions to provide an objective 
measure to evaluate the contribution that the claimed subject 
matter has made with respect to the state of prior art and to 
 
The invention is nonobvious if the number of choices is large 
enough that a person having ordinary skill in the art of invention 
(PHOSITA) would not have arrived at a successful result by trying 
out these choices. In applying this flexible obvious-to-try test, 
Judge Rader concluded that a PHOSITA would have arrived at the 
claimed DNA molecules with a reasonable expectation of success 
because a disclosure of the protein motivated the PHOSITA to 
isolate the DNA and a method for isolating DNAs was available. 
As a result, Chief Judge Rader eliminated the special rule in Deuel 
and revitalized the function of the nonobviousness standard, which 
harmonized U.S patentability with that of the rest of the world. 
                                                                                                         
26 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
27 Kubin, 561 F. 3d at 1359. 
28 Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1358. 
29 Id. 
10
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eliminate subject matter that is unworthy of a patent grant.30 To 
enhance this function, the Federal Circuit developed a practice of 
applying the teaching-motivation-suggestion test (TSM) in 
rejecting or invalidating claims for obviousness. The test requires 
an explicit or implicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation from the 
prior art, the nature of the problem, or the ordinary knowledge of 
those skilled to combine elements of the claimed invention 
disclosed in multiple prior art references.31 The test gives USPTO 
examiners and lower-court judges a framework to follow for 
obviousness assessments, which leads to objective and predictable 
results while protecting the assessments from hindsight.32 
However, the TSM test was under fire when the Supreme Court 
agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s well-established practice in 
response to criticisms from legal commentators that the test made 
it too difficult for the USPTO to reject claims directed to patent-
unworthy subject matter.33
Chief Judge Rader sought to preserve the TSM test by joining 
Judge Paul Redmond Michel, who was then chief judge, to issue 
an opinion in Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. 
C.H. Patrick Co.
 
34 In Dystar, Judge Michel reviewed the Federal 
Circuit case law and explained that the TSM test was in fact 
applied very flexibly in the cases he had reviewed, observing that 
the court took into account common sense and common knowledge 
when finding suggestion.35 The Supreme Court acknowledged 
Judge Michel’s effort to clarify the court’s practice and endorsed 
the application of the TSM test in nonobviousness assessment so 
long as the test is applied flexibly, as Judge Michel explained in 
Dystar.36
                                                                                                         
30 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 
31 In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
32 Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 
369 (2011). 
33 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-15 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
34 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
35 Id. at 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
36 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743. 
11
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In In re Translogic Technology, Inc.,37
On one level, KSR corrected a rather 
straightforward error. The error appears right before 
footnote 3 in this court’s opinion: 
 Chief Judge Rader 
clarified the effect of KSR on the TSM test and used his knowledge 
of foreign patent doctrines to comment on how his court made a 
mistake in KSR: 
In this case, the Asano patent does not address the 
same problem as the ’565 patent. The objective of 
the ’565 patent was to design a smaller, less 
complex, and less expensive electronic pedal 
assembly. The Asano patent, on the other hand, was 
directed at solving the ‘constant ratio problem.’ 
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l, Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 
288 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This passage overlooks the 
fundamental proposition that obvious variants of 
prior art references are themselves part of the public 
domain. In the context of KSR, the Asano teachings 
and its obvious variants were relevant prior art, 
even if that patent did address a different problem 
(the constant ratio problem).38
Patent offices and courts in European and Asian countries 
developed the notion of obvious variants by enlarging the novelty 
standard to eliminate patent-unworthy inventions before a separate 
requirement of an inventive step was incorporated.
   
39
Chief Judge Rader explained the Supreme Court’s instruction 
to take account of common sense and customary knowledge by 
analogy to the enlarged novelty inquiry, which takes account of 
variations of items disclosed in the prior art if the variants are 
 Under their 
current systems, some foreign courts take account of obvious 
equivalents in making the inventive step assessment. 
                                                                                                         
37 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
38 Id. at 1259 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
39 WIPO International Bureau, Enlarged Concept of Novelty and the Prior 
Art Effect of Certain Applications under Draft Article 8(2) of the SPTL (2004) 
(draft), http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/novelty/documents/5prov.pdf. 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/6
2012]  JUDGE RADER’S CONTRIBUTION TO COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 391 
obvious to a PHOSITA. He made clear that the TSM test is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent as long as the test is 
applied flexibly by taking into account obvious variants. He further 
emphasized the benefit of the test, which is acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court: “In any event, as the Supreme Court suggests, a 
flexible approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and focuses 
on evidence before the time of invention, without unduly 
constraining the breadth of knowledge available to one of ordinary 
skill in the art during the obviousness analysis.”40
Because of Chief Judge Rader’s clarification of the Court’s 
instruction, the TSM test continues to play a vital role in 






B.  Japan 
 
In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s TSM test, Japan’s IP High 
Court’s inventive step test came under fire for its stringent 
standard—legal commentators criticized it for often resulting in 
invalidity of patent filings due to lack of an inventive step.42 
According to JPO Examination Guidelines, examiners can find a 
motivation to combine multiple references if the art of reference is 
analogous to the art of invention. This requires similarity of field 
of endeavor or the problem between the invention and the 
references.43
                                                                                                         
40 Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1260  
 This practice allows JPO examiners to find a 
41 See, e.g., Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc, 655 F.3d 1352, 1361 (“This 
court has observed that teachings from prior art, suggestions beyond the literal 
teachings of those art references, or even motivations from the store of common 
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art field (“TSM”)—flexibly viewed 
and applied—provide the sources of evidence that an ordinary skilled artisan 
might have found and combined at the time of the invention.”); Ortho-McNeil 
Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] flexible 
TSM test remains the primary guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight 
analysis . . . .”). 
42 Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, IAA, Shigeo Takakura, 
Review of the Recent Trend in Patent Litigation from the Viewpoint of 
Innovation, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0242.html (last visited Apr. 
13). 
43 Japan Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model 
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motivation very easily and to reject claims for lack of an inventive 
step. 
In comparison, under Federal Circuit case law, the USPTO can 
only cite a prior art reference from the analogous art.44 In In re 
Rouffet, Chief Judge Rader made clear that a motivation to select 
and combine multiple references cannot be presumed simply 
because the references are analogous to the art of invention.45 Even 
if the problem or field of endeavor of references is similar to those 
of the claimed invention, USPTO examiners must identify a 
teaching from the references giving rise to a motivation. USPTO 
examiners can rely on the nature of a problem: the PHOSITA’s 
common knowledge to find a suggestion or motivation to combine 
references. If they rely on the knowledge of the PHOSITA, they 
must explain the specific understanding or principle within the 
knowledge that would motivate the PHOSITA to conceive a 
combination of elements as described in the claim. Without an 
explanation, it is likely that the examiners used hindsight to select 
the claimed combination,46 as Chief Judge Rader correctly pointed 
out in Monarch Knitting Machine Corp v. Sulzer Morat GmbH.47
To respond to criticisms from the legal community, Japan’s IP 
High Court adopted a test similar to the TSM test to guard against 
hindsight bias. In Hitachi Kasei v. Commissioner of Japan Patent 
Office,
 
Thus, USPTO examiners must explain a specific understanding if a 
suggestion comes from the nature of the problem because 
otherwise the USPTO and courts may formulate a problem in 
terms of the solution adopted by the inventor, thus relying 
improperly on the assistance of hindsight. 
48
                                                                                                         
in Japan, pt. II, ch. 2, 2.5(2), http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/ 
Guidelines/2_2.pdf. 
 the court reversed the JPO’s rejection for lack of 
inventive step by using a general framework for making an 
assessment of an inventive step:  
44 In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 
656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
45 In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355. 
46 Id. at 1358. 
47 139 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
48 Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.], January 28, 
2009, Hanrei Jiho [Hanji] No. 2043, 117, Hanrei Taimuzu No. 1299, 272.  
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Whether a PHOSITA would have readily conceived 
the claimed invention on basis of the prior art must 
be decided by addressing a question whether a 
PHOSITA started from the prior art and would have 
readily arrived at the characterized elements 
(elements which are different from elements 
disclosed in prior art references). The characterized 
elements are those which are essential for solving 
the problem of the invention. It is necessary to 
define the characterized elements, and thus the 
technical problem to be solved by the invention for 
making an objective assessment of inventive step 
whether a PHOSITA would have readily conceived 
the invention. It is also necessary to avoid hindsight 
or illogical analysis throughout this assessment. To 
avoid hindsight, one should not formulate 
unconsciously “the technical problem” of the 
invention should in terms of “the solution” or “the 
result from the solution.”49
The IP High Court further commented on a requirement of 
suggestion in the prior art:  
 
To conclude that the claimed invention does not 
involve inventive step, it is not sufficient that the 
prior art indicates a possibility that a PHOSITA 
could have made attempts to arrive at the essential 
elements of the claimed invention. The prior art 
must include a suggestion that a PHOSITA would 
have arrived at the essential elements.50
In INAX v. Commissioner of Japan Patent Office,
 
51
                                                                                                         
49 Id. Hanji at 126. 
 the IP High 
Court refined this framework for a combination invention 
consisting of elements from multiple references by requiring a 
specific understanding, as Chief Judge Rader required in Rouffet. 
50 Id. 
51 Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May. 27, 
2010, Hei 21 (gyō-ke) 10361, Saikō Saibansho Saibanrei Jōhō [Saibanrei Jōhō], 
http://www.courts.go.jp./hanrei/pdf/20100706093218.pdf. 
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After remaking the relatively simple structure of the claimed 
invention, the court commented on a risk of hindsight particularly 
associated with combination inventions: “[I]t is easy to lead to a 
conclusion that a PHOSTA readily adopt the solution of the 
invention once the problem of the invention is made clear.”52
In short, a test similar to the TSM is used by the IP High Court 
to make an objective assessment of an inventive step. By requiring 
an explanation with respect to a specific understanding or principle 
of how a PHOSITA would have reached the claimed invention, the 
IP High Court’s inventive-step assessment and the Federal 
Circuit’s nonobviousness assessment are protected from a risk of 
hindsight. 
 To 
avoid the risk, the court required JPO examiners to follow an 
analytical framework which consists of (1) a step of identifying the 
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art, and  
(2) a step of using a specific analytical process (understanding the 
significance of characterized elements in context of the technical 
problem and the solution for the problem while supplementing 
teachings from the prior art to determine whether a PHOSITA 
would have conceived the characterized elements). Unless the 
examiners can give an explanation for reaching their conclusion by 
following the specific analytical process, their conclusion of lack 
of an inventive step is improper. In INAX, the court found that the 
JPO did not make clear that it followed the analytical process 
because the JPO did not give an explanation for why a PHOSITA 
would have conceived the characterized elements by combining 
the references. Relying on this conclusion, the court revised the 
JPO’s decision. 
To maintain flexibility, both courts can take account of 
PHOSITA’s common sense and customary knowledge to explain 
the specific understanding or principle. This flexible application of 
the TSM test strikes a fine balance between two competing 
policies—providing a safeguard against hindsight and eliminating 
patent-unworthy inventions—as well as creates full harmony 
between the inventive step and nonobvious standards under 
Japanese and U.S. patent laws. 
                                                                                                         
52 Id. 
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III. ENABLEMENT AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
 
A.  The United States 
 
Another critical facet of patent law is the enablement of the 
invention and the written description of the invention in the patent 
application.  In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,53 
Chief Judge Rader was unsuccessful at convincing his colleagues 
to overrule Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.54
If 35 U.S.C. § 112 is compared with the written description and 
enablement requirements under the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) and JPA, his arguments make sense. Ariad relates to claims 
directing a method for regulating gene expression by a 
transcription factor called NF-[K]B, which may cause harmful 
symptoms. The majority found that the disclosure of the allegedly 
infringed patent was invalid for lack of an adequate written 
description because the disclosure did not disclose a method for 
regulating the factor, and thus did not support that the inventors 
possessed the claimed method on the effective filing date.
 and a series of precedents following Lilly in which the 
Federal Circuit, he believed, inappropriately applied the written 
description requirement to original claims. He argued that these 
cases made the written description requirement redundant with the 
enablement requirement if it applies to original claims in service of 
the same policy: policing the claim scope in contrast to the scope 
of disclosure. 
55
 In his dissenting opinion jointly authored with Judge Richard 
Linn, Chief Judge Rader argued that Lilly created a new written 
description doctrine that has no support in the patent statute and is 
inconsistent with the court’s pre-Lilly precedent, in which the 
written description requirement functioned solely for policing the 
priority and thus applied to new claims that were not part of the 
original disclosure. He was particularly concerned with the impact  
 
 
                                                                                                         
53 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
54 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
55 Id. at 1568. 
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resulting from the new doctrine upon a fine balance provided in the 
U.S. Constitution: 
The Constitution of the United States gives 
Congress, not the courts, the power to promote the 
progress of the useful arts by securing exclusive 
rights to inventors for limited times. Art. I, § 8, cl. 
8. Yet this court proclaims itself the body 
responsible for achieving the “right balance” 
between upstream and downstream innovation. 
Ante at 28. The Patent Act, however, has already 
established the balance by requiring that a patent 
application contain “a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making 
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” 35 
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). In rejecting 
that statutory balance in favor of an undefined 
“written description” doctrine, this court ignores the 
problems of standardless decision making and 
serious conflicts with other areas of patent law.56
Chief Judge Rader believes the new written description 
doctrine is redundant with the enablement requirement, serving the 
same policy of preventing inventors from claiming inventions that 
they did not invent, and thus failed to possess at the time of filing. 
In his view, a disclosure that is sufficient to meet the enablement 
requirement necessarily meets the requirement under the new 
doctrine for fully supporting a claim and showing the possession of 
the claimed invention by disclosing how to make and use the 
invention.
 
57 According to Judge Rader, the new doctrine is not 
only unnecessary but also harmful because the test of the new 
doctrine is not well defined and is therefore difficult for courts and 
applicants to apply.58
Moreover, the new doctrine is in tension with an important rule 
 
                                                                                                         
56 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
57 Enzo, 323 F.3d at 980-81. 
58 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1364 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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for claim interpretation. If claims are interpreted in light of the 
disclosure in the specification according to the rule that the en banc 
Federal Circuit adopted in Phillips, the claims should correspond 
with the scope of disclosure so that the disclosure fully supports 
the claims.59 The new doctrine is also in tension with a rule that a 
patent owner of an improvement may infringe a patent of a basic 
invention on which the improvement is based.60
 
 It follows that an 
inventor of a basic invention is entitled to the scope covering any 
improvements that were nonobvious at the filing of the 
improvement patent and were not in the inventor’s possession at 
the filing of the basic patent. Chief Judge Rader is concerned that 
the new doctrine invalidates claims that were issued to cover a 
genus, including species and improvements which can be 
separately patentable, and that were not in the inventor’s 
possession at the filing date of the genus claim patent, effectively 
eliminating blocking patents.  
B.  Europe 
 
European and Japanese judges face a similar challenge of 
distinguishing the enablement requirement and the written 
description requirement and finding a compromise between 
policies underlying the enablement-written description 
requirements and claim interpretation. The EPC codifies the 
enablement requirement and the written description in separate 
sections.61
                                                                                                         
59 Id. at 1365. 
 Unlike the U.S. Patent Act, where both requirements 
are directed to the sufficiency of disclosure in the specification, the 
EPC’s written description is directed to the sufficiency of claims. 
In contract, the enablement requirement is directed to the 
sufficiency of disclosure in the specification. Another important 
difference between the U.S. Patent Act and the EPC is that a 
60 Id. 
61 European Patent Convention (EPC) art. 83 requires patent application 
describing the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be 
carried out by a PHOSITA (the enablement requirement). EPC art. 84 requires 
the claims to be clear and concise and be supported by the description (the 
written-description requirement). 
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violation of the enablement requirement under the EPC is grounds 
for rejection during the pre-grant examination as well as grounds 
for revocation during the post-grant opposition, while the written 
description requirement is grounds for rejection during the pre-
grant examination only.62
EPC member states incorporated these requirements into their 
national patent laws as provided by the EPC. Thus, U.K. Patents 
Act 1977 (UKPA) copied the terms of these requirements under 
the EPC and provides sufficiency requirements for the disclosure 
and claims.
 Thus, these requirements are not 
completely redundant. 
63 Reflecting the grounds for post grant opposition 
under the EPC, the UKPA provides only the enablement 
requirement as a ground for invalidating U.K. patents.64
The Act does not contain any definition of the word 
“supported” but some assistance can be obtained 
from the provisions of section 14(5) which require 
the claim in an application to be “supported” by the 
description. That must, I think, involve the 
conclusion that if that which is contained in the 
description of the specification does not enable the 
claim to be established, it cannot be said to 
“support” it, for the Act can hardly have 
contemplated a complete application for a patent 
lacking some of the material necessary to sustain 
the claims made.
 U.K. 
judges seem puzzled about why only one of the two requirements 
is a ground for invalidation. These requirements appear to serve 
the same policy and are seemingly redundant. Lord Oliver of 
U.K.’s highest court, the House of Lords, confirmed this view: 
65
In Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc, Lord Hoffmann from U.K.’s 
 
                                                                                                         
62 EPC art. 100. 
63 Patents Act 1977 (UKPA) § 14(3) requires the specification of an 
application to disclose the invention in a manner that is clear enough and 
complete enough for the invention to be performed by a PHOSITA (the 
enablement requirement). UKPA § 14(5)(c) requires the claim or claims to be 
supported by the description (the written-description requirement). 
64 UKPA § 72. 
65 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application, [1991] R.P.C. 485. 
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House of Lords agreed with Lord Oliver that the two requirements 
are redundant and therefore only one of them, the enablement 
requirement, is listed as a ground for invalidation under the 
UKPA.66
In contrast, both requirements are grounds for invalidation 
under the U.S. Patent Act, despite Judge Rader’s conclusion that 
these requirements are completely redundant. Enablement has a 
long history of serving the policy of policing the claim scope and 
establishing a predictable test. If the Federal Circuit finds it 
necessary to tighten the policy, the court should use the 
enablement requirement instead of the written description 
requirement.  
 
European judges also agree with Judge Rader that there is a 
tension between the enablement-written description requirements 
and the claim interpretation and the blocking patent doctrines. In 
Generics Limited v. H. Lundbech A/S,67
Furthermore, Article 84 EPC also requires that the 
claims must be supported by the description, in 
other words it is the definition of the invention in 
the claims that needs support. In the Board’s 
judgment, this requirement reflects the general legal 
principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as 
defined by the claims, should correspond to the 
technical contribution to the art in order for it to be 
supported, or justified . . . .
 Lord Walker further 
reinforced the view that the two requirements are redundant by 
citing Exxon/Fuel Oils, in which the enlarged board of the 
European Patent Office interpreted the enablement and written 
description provisions under the EPC: 
68
Like Chief Judge Rader, Lord Walker has commented on the 
interaction between the enablement-written description 
requirements and the claim interpretation and blocking patent 
doctrines and tries to justify the scope of a patent that includes 
subject matter that is not sufficiently disclosed to enable a 
 
                                                                                                         
66 Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc [1997] R.P.C. 1. 
67 Generics Ltd. v. H. Lundbech A/S, [2009] UKHL 12. 
68 T 0409/91, OJ EPO 1994, 653 (“Fuel oils/EXXON”). 
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PHOSITA to carry out the subject matter without undue burden.69 
Relying on the above comment in Exxon, he concluded that claims 
and disclosure meet the enablement and written description 
requirements as long as the scope corresponds to the technical 
contribution. As described in Generics, in chemical and 
biotechnological fields, a claim frequently directs to an 
improvement of early compounds and DNAs that is covered by a 
claim in an earlier application, which Chief Judge Rader identified 
as the blocking conditions occurring in Ariad.70
Lord Walker affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding that the 
claim for the (+) enantiomer of the known anti-depressant is valid. 
The scope of the claim should extend to any (+) enantiomer of the 
product regardless of the method for making the enantiomer 
without violating the enablement and written description 
requirement, even if many of these methods are not being enabled 
or supported by the disclosure of the patent. Because the court 
found that the technical contribution of the claimed invention is to 
produce the (+) enantiomer, the scope should not be limited by a 
method of making the enantiomer. In other words, under the 
UKPA, a blocking condition occurs with respect to species and 
improvements that the patentee did not enable or possess if the 
improvements are within the technical contribution. 
 
In contrast, the Ariad majority’s rigid application of the 
possession test may eliminate all blocking conditions, which will 
encourage knowledge exchange through cross-licensing between 
upstream and downstream patent owners and expose basic patents 
on genus chemical compounds and DNAs to the challenge of 
invalidity for a violation of the written description requirement.71
 
 
European judges would have agreed with Chief Judge Rader that 
an objective standard is necessary for upholding a blocking patent 
even if the disclosure does not support the inventor’s possession of 
species and improvements which fall within the scope of the 
blocking patent.  
 
                                                                                                         
69 Generics Ltd. at ¶¶ 37-38. 
70 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 1366 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Japan 
 
Japanese judges would likely agree with Chief Judge Rader’s 
assertion that the enablement and written description requirements 
should not be redundant in serving the same policy. The JPA’s 
written description and enablement requirements mirror these 
requirements under the EPC.72 A major difference from the EPC is 
that the JPA makes clear that both requirements are grounds for 
revocation after patent issuance.73
In Boehringer Ingelheim v. Commissioner of Japan Patent 
Office,
 Thus, Lord Hoffmann’s 
justification for having redundant requirements does not apply to 
the requirements under the JPA. Therefore, like Judge Rader, 
Japanese judges try to distinguish the enablement requirement 
from the written-description requirement. 
74
Article 36, Paragraph 4, Item 1, requires “a detailed 
explanation of the invention,” that includes the 
“necessary data to allow a person ordinarily skilled 
in the art who may try to understand the invention 
 the JPO rejected a claim that directed to the use of 
flibanserin to treat sexual disorders due to a failure to meet the 
written-description requirement. The JPO explained that the claim 
did not direct to an invention described in the specification because 
the disclosure did not include a description of the pharmacological 
data or its equivalent to establish the utility of the claimed 
compound for treating sexual disorders. On appeal, the IP High 
Court revised the JPO’s decision for erroneously relying on the 
written-description requirement. The Court distinguished the 
policy underlying the written description requirement from that of 
the enablement requirement. 
                                                                                                         
72 JPA art. 36, para. 4 requires a detailed explanation of the invention, 
including a description of invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete 
for the invention to be worked by a PHOSITA (the enablement requirement). 
JPA art. 36, para. 6, item 1 requires a claimed invention being included in the 
written description of the specification (the written description requirement).   
73 JPA art. 123, para. 1, item 4. 
74 Judgment of the IP High Court of Japan, Jan. 22, 2010, Hanrei Jiho 
[Hanji] No. 2073, 105. English translation of the case by the author is available 
in ADELMAN ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW 172 (2011). 
23
Takenaka: Chief Judge Rader's Contribution to Comparative Patent Law
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
402 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:4 
to understand the relevant technical problems and 
how to solve them, and be able to understand the 
technical significance of the invention.” . . . The 
purpose of this provision is to create a patent system 
that grants a monopoly right for a set period of time 
to inventors who publically disclose their invention 
as compensation for that disclosure. 
In contrast, Article 36, Paragraph 6, Item 1 requires 
that the “claim” include “a detailed description of 
the invention for which a patent is sought.” . . . If 
the scope of “claim” exceeds the scope of technical 
information described and disclosed in the “detailed 
explanation of the invention,” a grant of an 
exclusive right to such claims conflicts with the 
purpose of a patent system where an exclusive right 
is granted only to the extent of the scope of 
disclosure because a patent is granted as 
compensation for that disclosure. Thus, Article 36, 
Paragraph 6, Item 1 does not allow the inclusion of 
claims that exceed the scope of disclosure. For 
example, if the “embodiments” description only 
allows for a limited and narrow understanding of 
the technical aspects of the invention, while the 
“claims” description goes beyond the technical 
description encompassing a much wider technical 
scope, the claims will be in conflict with Article 36, 
Paragraph 6, Item 1, and should not be allowed.75
In short, the enablement requirement relates to the policy for 
making sure that a PHOSITA understands the invention 
sufficiently to carry out the invention, whereas the written-
description requirement relates to the policy of ensuring that the 
scope of exclusive right corresponds to the scope of disclosure. To 
reject a claim for a violation of the written-description 
requirement, the JPO must compare the scope of the claim and the 
scope of disclosure. Because the JPO’s rejection did not determine 
 
                                                                                                         
75 Id.; ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 172-73. 
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whether the claim scope exceeded the scope of disclosure, the IP 
High Court concluded that the JPO erroneously relied on the 
written-description requirement for rejecting the claim.  
Japanese judges appear to share the same concern that Chief 
Judge Rader and Judge Linn indicated in Ariad: the claims at issue 
should have been rejected for lack of enablement instead of the 
written-description requirement.76 Like Boehringer Ingelheim, the 
invalidity arguments in Lilly do not compare the claim scope with 
the scope of disclosure. Instead, the arguments focused on whether 
the disclosure in the Ariad patent includes a method of regulating 
the transcription factor.77
 
 By failing to include any method for 
performing the regulation, the disclosure does not provide enough 
information to make and use the claimed invention. Because any 
claim scope is enabled, the proper ground for invalidating the 
claim should the enablement requirement. By allowing the written-
description requirement to invalidate non-enabled claims, the 
majority marginalized the function of the enablement requirement 
as done by the JPO in Boehringer Ingelheim.  
CONCLUSION 
 
As the author of another article in this festschrift correctly 
points out, Chief Judge Rader uses a wide range of analytical 
methodologies and looks beyond traditional legal authorities in 
developing patent jurisprudence.78
                                                                                                         
76 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1372 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 The comparative law method is 
one such methodology that he uses to interpret the statutory terms 
and develop new doctrines. The U.S. opinions, as well as the 
European and Japanese decisions influenced by Chief Judge 
Rader’s work, reviewed in this Article are merely examples of his 
jurisprudence, highlighting his knowledge of foreign patent laws 
and his influence on European and Japanese judges. Through his 
openness to foreign patent law and eagerness to share his 
experiences with foreign judges, Chief Judge Rader stimulates 
academic discussions of U.S. patent jurisprudence in the context of  
 
77 Id. at 1354. 
78 See Lee, supra note 8, at 418. 
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comparative law and greatly contributes to the harmonization of 
patent systems. 
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